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Bobbio in pravni pozitivizem

Tridelba in njen avtor sam
Bobbio and Legal Positivism. The Triple Distinction and Bobbio Himself
Juan Ruiz Manero
Translated by Andrej Kristan
p. 7–12
This article is a translation of:
Bobbio y el positivismo

Abstracts

The paper critically examines Bobbio's famous disctinction between legal positivism as a method, a theory and an ideology. The author first highlights certain problems of the distinction itself and then focuses on Bobbio's self-determined position within it. Delving on Bobbio's analysis of the concepts of basic norm and rule of recognition, he demonstrates how Bobbio's later rejection of these two concepts implies acceptance of positivistic legal theory and ideology – despite the fact that he explicitly rejected them in the first place. The reason for this Bobbio's slip is found in his absorbtion in the positivist legal culture which is permeated with the internal point of view on the law. The author suggests rejecting Bobbio's tripartite disctinction of legal positivism and proposes instead to view this as a set of seldom indvisible standpoints forming a specific legal culture.

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Excerpt

In open access from November 2017.

First lines

1. Dobro je znana Bobbieva razčlenitev treh pomenov izraza pravni pozitivizem: pozitivizem kot splošni pristop k učenju prava, pozitivizem kot nauk o pravu in pozitivizem kot pravna ideologija. Naj jih na hitro predstavim. V prvem pomenu – tj. kot pristop k učenju prava – pozitivizem vzpostavlja »jasno razliko med pravom, kakršno je, in pravom, kakršno bi moralo biti«, obenem pa zavzema »prepričanje, da se mora pravnik ukvarjati s prvim, in ne z drugim«. V drugem pomenu – tj. kot posebni nauk o pravu – pozitivizem zaznamujejo nauk o prisilnosti prava, imperativizem, vrhovnost zakona in razumevanje, da je pravni red zapolnjen (tj. brez pravnih praznin) in notranje skladen (tj. brez antinomij). V tretjem pomenu – kot pravna ideologija – pozitivizem pravu pripisuje pozitivno vrednost že samo zato, ker obstaja; po skrajnejši različici pa pozitivizem »že samo zato, ker postavljeno pravo obstaja, smatra, da je to pravično«, in ker je pravično, naj bi ga bili dolžni spoštovati. Ta tridelba...

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References

Bibliographical reference

Juan Ruiz Manero, « Bobbio in pravni pozitivizem », Revus, 26 | 2015, 7–12.

Electronic reference

Juan Ruiz Manero, « Bobbio in pravni pozitivizem », Revus [Online], 26 | 2015, Online since 01 November 2017, connection on 29 June 2017. URL : http://revus.revues.org/3439

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About the author

Juan Ruiz Manero

redni profesor filozofije prava na Univerzi v Alicanteju (Španija)

Juan Ruiz Manero
Universidad de Alicante
Ap. de correos, 99
03080, Alicante
España

juan.ruiz@ua.es

By this author

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